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Abstract
Although practitioners have mapped the alignment between IT-related standards, this work has rarely
been reported in the academic literature. In particular the methods used have not been made explicit,
which has limited the value of any reported results. The research described in this paper
demonstrates a rigorous method for mapping the alignment between two example IT security
standards. The two standards were Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology
(COBIT), widely used as a comprehensive IT control framework, and the Australian Government
Information and Communications Technology Security Manual (ACSI 33) which sets out policies and
procedures for IT security for Australian government agencies. Conceptual analysis was used to
analyse the alignment between the two standards to reveal some insightful patterns of use and
emphasis. As one of the security standards defines the base level ICT security for Australian
government agencies, related future work using conceptual analysis has the potential to contribute to
improved evaluation of the preparedness of commercial Australian organisations to protect the
security of their systems from terrorist activities. This paper illustrates the value of such work within a
counter-terrorist setting, where leverage for systems security compliance can be gained from
voluntary adoption of a commercial standard.
Keywords: COBIT, ACSI 33, Systems security, Content analysis, Counter-terrorism.

1

INTRODUCTION

It is now impossible for organisations to manage without information systems (Ahlgren, Breidne and
Hector 2005, Brooks, Warren and Hutchinson 2002). However, the benefits that information systems
bring to organisations are also accompanied by risks (Hale and Brusil 2004). Information security was
the leading concern about technology in 2007 (The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) 2007). The AICPA views information security as the hardware, software procedures and
processes in an organisation that are designed to protect its information systems from both external
and internal threats. Information assurance is a process to ensure that the desired information security
goals for an organisation are achieved. Risk analysis aims to reduce the vulnerabilities that impact on
computer systems in organisations, which may vary from hardware and software issues, to those that
deal with human resources and business issues (Brooks et al. 2002). The same vulnerabilities may
also threaten national security, as “…increasing dependence upon telecommunications and
information infrastructures puts at risk the economic, political and military security of the free world”
(Romero 2005, p. 101).
Although many approaches have been taken to security risk analysis, one approach is to develop and
implement “minimally acceptable security countermeasures” (Brooks et al.) 2002, p. 377. One such
countermeasure is the use of Information Systems (IS) security standards in organisations, which are
often referred to as Information Technology (IT) security standards. Because different organisations
use different IT security standards, and some use more than one standard of this type, it is useful to
understand the differences and commonalities between these standards. Consequently, there has been
considerable interest recently in mapping IT standards in the practitioner literature, particularly IT
security standards. One example of this work is the mapping of COBIT and ISO 17799 (27002) (ITGI
2000). A strong motivation for this work is to determine the degree of compliance with one IT security
standard when implementing another.
Even though many practitioner studies have mapped a range of IT security standards against others,
little if any explanation of the methods used has been provided in such work, which limits the
confidence of academics in the findings. Furthermore, almost no academic studies have been
published that consider the alignment between IT security and other standards. The study reported
upon in this paper aimed to identify a scholarly method for mapping the alignment between IT
security-related standards. The method is implemented using two IT security-related standards, the
Australian Government Information and Communications Technology Security Manual (ACSI 33) and
the information assurance aspects of The Control Objectives for Information and related Technology
(COBIT) as examples. To demonstrate the potential value of undertaking research that maps IT
security standards, this study is set within a counter-terrorism context. However, a range of other IT
security standards could be mapped using the method, which would not necessarily have a counterterrorism setting.
ACSI 33 is a baseline IT security standard which has been developed by the Defence Signals
Directorate (DSD) of the Australian Department of Defence. ACSI 33 provides guidance to
Australian Government departments, agencies and commercial service providers on minimum
standards for their information and communication technology (ICT) security (DSD 2006). ACSI 33 is
designed to strengthen the security of sensitive data and systems used by government agencies, in part,
to counter terrorist ICT activity. Many, but not all, of the standards set out in ACSI 33 are mandatory
for the organisations to which they apply. COBIT is a standard that includes IT security issues but
focuses on the alignment between the use of IT (and hence IT security) and the achievement of
organisational business goals. Numerous organisations have adopted COBIT, even though there may
be no requirement for them to do so, in order to access the commercial benefits that accompany its
effective implementation.

2

BACKGROUND

2.1

Counter-terrorism and IT security

There are two ways in which the security of nations is dependent on ICT. Romero (2005) reports that
first, the ongoing delivery of goods and services to sustain the economy, trade and the military, is
critical for national security. These goods and services arise from activities that include
manufacturing, governing, banking and finance, all of which rely on ICT. Second, critical
infrastructures like power, telecommunication, transport, banking and finance are also dependent upon
ICT (Romero 2005). Any one of these critical activities could be disrupted by a terrorist attack on a
nation’s ICT.
The inter-relatedness of national information infrastructures for the public and private sectors is of
concern (Ahlgren et al. 2005). As an example, in the United States of America (US) the bulk of the
telecommunications section of the national information infrastructure is provided by commercial
providers (Andrews 1996). Consequently, some aspects of national security depend upon the security
of computer systems of commercial organisations. This characteristic is one reason why governments
take an interest in the information security of commercial organisations, particularly as numerous
security threats to the computer systems of commercial organisations have been widely acknowledged.
The US Department of Homeland Security called for cooperation among government, academics and
private industry to reduce vulnerability for information security (Hawkins, Alhhajjaj and Kelly 2003).
One way to reduce the security risk arising from ICT dependence is to adopt ICT security standards.
2.2

Baseline security standards

Information security standards are published by organisations for a variety of audiences. A diversity
in level and granularity of information security standards reflects an essential problem with security
standards. Although the security best practice for a specific piece of ICT infrastructure may be sought,
the answer is likely to depend upon the relevant current security goals, which will have been arrived at
by organisational processes at a much higher level.
Some security standards are overtly about technology. These standards are published so that vendors
and purchasers of ICT equipment can be sure that the specified security functionality is present and
performs to the stated specification level. Such standards conform to a more traditional idea of
standards; statements against which evaluation can take place. The Trusted Computer Security
Evaluation Criteria (DoD 1985) was the first of such criteria. The European Information Technology
Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC Working Group, 1991) brought together expertise and
experiences to define a set of criteria still in use today. This use of international expertise to produce
combined international evaluation standards is reflected in the Common Criteria (Common Criteria
Editorial Board 1998) which incorporate experiences and work from Canada, the European ITSEC
community and the US. It is these evaluation criteria that are most commonly referred to in
technology specific standards. Phrases such as ‘Agencies should select products from the Evaluated
Products List’ (ACSI 33, p3–21) are typically found in more general standards.
Management level security standards have also converged to become international standards adopted
as national standards. ISO/IEC 1779:2005 is adopted in Australia and New Zealand as AS/NZS
ISO/IEC 1779:2006 while the British Standard, BS 7799 is now an international standard, ISO/IEC
270001. An important feature of both these standards is their focus on first defining the desired
security goals for an organisation. Emphasis is placed on risk analysis as an essential pre-requisite to
defining security requirements and selecting controls. Essentially however, the standards are about
suggested controls for implementing and managing ICT security, and are guidelines for best practice.

ACSI 33 is a security standard that is designed to ensure that the ICT systems of Australian
government agencies are appropriately protected (DSD, 2007); it is updated each year. ACSI 33
reflects a similar history to other security standards. Although it was originally designed for IT
specialists (Brooks et al. 2002), consistent with the need for ICT security risk analysis to consider a
broad range of issues, it has evolved to include user training and awareness, the ICT product lifecycle
and ICT security roles and responsibilities. ACSI 33 makes extensive use of the terms, MUST,
SHOULD and RECOMMEND to guide its intended audience on the level of compliance required. It is
divided into three parts, with chapters within each section devoted to particular topics.
COBIT is not specifically a security standard and therefore differs in its scope and purpose to ACSI
33. COBIT is an internationally accepted control framework for IT that facilitates managers to bridge
the gap relevant to control requirements, technical issues and business risks. However, as it is designed
to be comprehensive, it includes IT security controls. COBIT consists of IT processes that can be
categorised into four major domains: Plan and Organise (PO), Acquire and Implement (AI), Deliver
and Support (DS), and Monitor and Evaluate (ME). The domains are intended to broadly parallel the
phases of the systems development life cycle. An IT process is a:
…collection of IT-oriented procedures influenced by the organisation’s policies and procedures
that takes inputs from a number of sources, including other processes, manipulates the inputs, and
produces outputs, including other processes (IT Governance Institute 2007, p.192).

Each of COBIT’s IT processes, and the lower level control objectives associated with each IT process,
has a code that indicates the domain from which it comes. For example, the IT process DS5 belongs
to the Deliver and Support domain. A control objective states the desired result or purpose to be
achieved by implementing control objectives in a process (IT Governance Institute 2007, p.190).
Efforts to comply with the US Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 (Brown and Nasuti 2005) by
adopting COBIT provides much of the explanation for COBIT’s burgeoning international popularity.
Internal control assertions after the introduction of SOX changed from being largely voluntary, to
being based on the Internal Control Integrated Framework from the Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) (Damianides 2005). COSO is a control
framework that is used around the world for financial reporting, and has influenced COBIT.
It can seen that there is a tension between those Information Security (IS) security standards that focus
on technology alone, and those that acknowledge that security is driven by organisational goals. The
latter standards have been associated with a growing interest in security governance.
2.3

Security governance

Even though information security is not only a technical issue, often organisations deal with it in this
way (Connor and Coviello 2004). Ahlgren et al. (2005) report that only around 10% of information
security is about technology. If this figure is even approximately accurate, the need to go beyond
technical issues when dealing with information security is compelling.
Information security is also a business and governance issue. As information security involves risk
management, reporting and accountability “…(t)he road to …(it) goes through corporate governance”,
where corporate governance is the “…set of policies and internal controls by which organisations…are
directed and managed” (Connor et al. 2004, p. 5). Therefore, for security to be effective, an
organisation’s information security governance needs to be embedded into its corporate governance
and is closely related to its IT governance. Consequently, information security will be an integral
component of organisational operations, requiring the engagement of executive management (Connor
et al. 2004). It can be seen that security governance is an organisational issue that needs to consider
“people, business processes, infrastructure, applications, information and facilities” (Allen 2006, p. 3).

Best-in-class organisations consider a broad range of issues to address their security, in addition to
technology, including their structure, strategy, processes and metrics (Hurley 2005). That is, best-inclass organisations practice security governance. There is evidence that organisations that are most
effective at security governance achieve advantages that include reduced risk, and increased customer
confidence, cost savings and profit, while accelerating information flow between and among
customers, business partners, suppliers and employees (Hurley 2005). These benefits motivate
organisations to improve their governance of IT security issues.
2.4

Leveraging systems security compliance from use of commercial standards

The United States (US) Corporate Governance Task Force has recommended that the US Department
of Homeland Security should encourage private sector organisations to integrate cyber security within
their corporate governance strategies (Connor et al. 2004). The same authors also proposed that the IT
controls of organisations need more attention, and called for revision of COSO to include information
security governance. As COBIT has drawn upon COSO in its development, the US Corporate Task
Force suggested that COBIT and ISO 17799 (27002) be used by organisations to guide their
governance of information security (Connor et al. 2004). However, the US Corporate Task Force has
stated that information security governance to strengthen cyber security is most effectively achieved
voluntarily, rather than being mandated by government (Connor et al. 2004). Therefore voluntary
adoption of COBIT by commercial organisations is more likely to be effective for improved
information security than enforcing compliance with a standard like ACSI 33.
The research reported upon in this paper aimed in part to investigate whether is was feasible to
identify the alignment between COBIT’s information security objectives with ACSI 33. Determining
this feasibility has the potential to reveal the degree to which commercially-driven implementation of
COBIT will also satisfy compliance with the systems security goals of ACSI 33. Such results have the
potential to allow leveraging from the voluntary adoption of COBIT by organisations for the
commercial benefits it brings, to enable greater awareness and monitoring by the Australian
government of the ICT security practices of commercial (and also public) organisations. For example,
as stated earlier the critical infrastructure of many nations is controlled by private enterprise to a large
degree. Understanding the commonality and differences between a commercially driven standard
used for IT security like COBIT and a national government IT security standard (like ACSI 33) could
help inform government of the degree to which private enterprise organisations comply with a national
government IT security standard when adopting a commercial IT standard. This understanding may
contribute to improved evaluation by government of the preparedness of Australian commercial
organisations to protect the security of their IT systems from terrorist activities.
Further, as many IT security standards exist and they have different goals, as was discussed in Section
2.2, there will be a need to compare these standards for coverage and emphasis. Therefore the
investigation also sought a method for investigating the alignment between two standards that address
security that could be justified for an academic audience, as there appear to be almost no
academically-focussed publications that have done so. While this method will be demonstrated
through comparison of the information assurance aspects of COBIT and ACSI 33, other security
standards could be chosen for the mapping process, such as ISO27001 and the IT Infrastructure
Library (ITIL). The identification and utilisation of a method for mapping one ICT security standard
to another, while retaining academic rigour, will in itself make a contribution to the literature.

3
3.1

METHODOLOGY
Content analysis

Content analysis is a quantitative, systematic research method that determines an occurrence of key
words or concepts in texts or other forms of communication (Busch et al., 2005; Carley, 1993).
Content analysis is used in policy analysis (Jauch et al, 1980) to examine the level of compliance with
laws, rules, policies and procedures, as well as to evaluate the alignment between the activities and the
goals, objectives and strategies stated in the policy (Texas State Auditor’s Office, 1995). However, in
the information security academic literature, content analysis appears to be a novel method. This is
possibly because content analysis has been used mainly in the social sciences and humanities, while
those working in the information security area are more likely to have a background from the sciences.
From a search of relevant scholarly literature only one application of content analysis to the security
area was identified. In that publication information security threats, controls and standards were
analysed to identify generic components of malicious software (Brooks et al. 2002). However, in
common with practitioner studies to map IT standards, little explanation of the process of applying
content analysis was provided in this study.
Two main types of content analysis exist. The first is Conceptual Analysis, which focuses on the
occurrence or frequencies of concepts that are usually described by words or phrases in the text. The
second is Relational Analysis, in which the relationship among concepts in the text is examined
(Busch et al., 2005). As the aim of the investigation was to explore mapping the information
assurance concepts from ACSI 33 to those in COBIT, the focus was on determining the occurrence
and frequency of common concepts, rather than to evaluate the relationship among the concepts.
Consequently, conceptual analysis was adopted for the current investigation.
A number of limitations in undertaking content analysis has been acknowledged. Unless the process is
repeatable, the method is seen as subjective and lacking in rigour. Therefore a critical step in
undertaking content analysis is to examine inter-coder reliability (often referred to as inter-coder
agreement) which measures the agreement between two or more coders, disregarding the agreement
by chance. As another approach to reduce subjectivity, methodologies have been developed for
undertaking content analysis consistently, for example, the process developed by Carley (1993). A
particular difficulty in mapping standards has been acknowledged, associated with different levels and
granularity of some standards when compared to others. For example, some standards like COBIT are
at a higher level than detailed procedures of other standards, like ISO.IEC 17799 (27002):2005. The
method developed for mapping needs to be capable of accommodating such differences.
3.2

Procedure and analysis

Carley’s (1993) method for content analysis was followed by two researchers trained in the technique,
with prior experience at mapping standards, including mapping using COBIT. The eight-step
procedure followed is set out in Table 1 below, along with a discussion of the application of each
phase to the current research project.
Before Step 1 commenced, the researchers selected the documentation for analysis to identify key
concepts, to be used in the mapping process. This preliminary step involved selecting the versions of
ACSI 33 (unclassified September 2006 version) and COBIT (version 4.1) to be used for analysis, and
then identifying the information assurance concepts in ACSI 33 for mapping to COBIT 4.1. Only
Parts 2 and 3 of ACSI 33 were considered, as the content of Part 1 was repeated in the other two parts.

Agreement was reached with the Defence Signals Directorate on the definition of Information
Assurance, and its source, to be used for analysis during the project.
Step no.
1. Decide the level of analysis (whether to code for a
single word or sets of words or phrases)
2. Decide how many concepts to code for (whether to
use predefined or interactive concept choices)
3. Decide whether to code for existence or frequency
of a concept (answer the question: Am I going to code
for existence or frequency?)

4. Decide on how to distinguish among concepts
(whether concepts are coded as they appear or as the
same even if they occur in a different form)

5. Developing rules for coding texts (create translation
rules to allow the researcher to control & organise the
coding processes)
6. Decide how to deal with non-relevant information
(whether to ignore/reanalyse/modify the coding rules)
7. Coding the text (undertake textual coding, using
manual methods or automated software)
8. Analysis of results (including inter-coder reliability)

Table 1.

Content analysis phases followed, and application to the investigation (adapted from
Carley 2003).

ACSI 33 concepts for software security
ICT Security Plan
Security Requirements for Software Development
Software Security Requirements for Email

Software Security Requirements for Malicious Code
and Anti-Virus Software

Table 2.

Application to current project
Word or phrases were coded to capture broad-based
concepts
A list of concepts was developed incrementally during
the coding process as it allowed more complete coding
of all the concepts that appeared in the text
Coding both for existence and frequency was
undertaken. Coding for existence aimed to identify the
key information assurance concepts presented in ACSI
33 and to examine whether these concepts also
appeared in COBIT. Coding for frequency allowed the
most strongly aligned concepts to be identified.
Concepts were coded as the same even when they
appeared in different forms. Eg, while coding
“Hardware destruction”, other sets of words with the
same or similar meanings were recorded as matched
concepts, including “Agencies [MUST] destroy
unsanitised classified media…”, and “To destroy
media, agencies [MUST]…”. This step helped
accommodate differences in the levels and styles of the
standards referred to as a limitation of the method.
A thesaurus of terms for related concepts from the text,
to be used for analysis, was compiled. Examples of the
translation rules used are shown in Table 2.
Non-relevant information in both ACSI 33 and COBIT
was discarded.
Analysis and classification were done manually; it was
not possible to classify accurately the implicit textual
characteristics using software.
To reduce subjectivity, a reliability co-efficient was
sought within range, 0.7–0.9, from independent coding
of sample by second researcher; results of mapping
analysis presented as frequencies in tables and figures.

Rules (look for any word or sets of words that…)
Demonstrates the development & deployment of ICT
security plan and procedures
Demonstrates the procedures that ensure the security of
software development
Demonstrates the procedures used to ensure that email
is securely used (and/or) managed within the
organisation
Demonstrates the procedures used to ensure that
malicious code and anti-virus software is properly and
securely used and managed within the organisation

Examples of translation rules used in analysis to derive thesaurus (Phase 5).

The analysis, results and discussion after mapping the information assurance elements of COBIT to
ACSI 33 are presented in the following section.

4

ANALYSIS, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The final step of Carley’s (1993) process for content analysis required evaluation of inter-coder
reliability, and undertaking analysis to examine the alignment of the two standards. Analysis of intercoder reliability fell within the accepted range, when two independent methods were used to measure
inter-coder agreement. Example results of analysis of the alignment of COBIT 4.1 and ACSI 33 are
provided below, presented as frequencies in tables and a figure, with discussion, to demonstrate
application of the method and its potential.
4.1

Information assurance concepts by domain and IT process

As COBIT is designed to cover more than information assurance, and ACSI 33 is largely about
information assurance, identifying the COBIT components that dealt with information assurance was a
broad way of revealing the commonality between the two standards. By applying the method it was
possible to identify information assurance concepts in 26 of COBIT’s 34 IT processes, spread across
all four domains, as seen in Table 3.
COBIT domain
Plan and Organise (PO)
Acquire and Implement (AI)
Deliver and Support (DS)
Monitor and Evaluate (ME)

Table 3.

No. of IT processes
containing info assurance
8
6
9
3

Total no. of IT processes
in COBIT
10
7
13
4

Domains and IT processes in COBIT containing information assurance concepts.

The results indicate that COBIT is concerned with information assurance to a considerable extent, and
suggest that despite differences in the nature of the two example IT security-related standards to be
mapped, it will be possible to map the alignment between ACSI 33 and the information assurance
aspects of COBIT. This finding also suggests that by adopting COBIT, organisations will be likely to
at least partly comply with ACSI 33. So therefore, for example, if private enterprise critical
infrastructure organisations adopt COBIT, and the extent of the adoption is known, the results of this
mapping process could inform the Australian Government of the degree of their compliance with
ACSI 33. Consequently, the Australian Government will also better understand the preparedness of
those organisations’ ICT systems to be resilient under terrorist attack.
4.2

Mapping of information assurance concepts by control objectives

Next, analysis was undertaken of the alignment between each of the four domains from COBIT and
ACSI 33, working at the chapter level of ACSI 33.
Using the method, the key concepts were identified, and a thesaurus of equivalent terms found was
developed for each concept as the mapping progressed. The method revealed the frequency in
alignment between COBIT and each ACSI 33 chapter. In this study the greatest alignment was found
in COBIT’s Deliver and Support domain. The method also allowed the researchers to drill down into
COBIT at the control objective level. In our study the three IT processes, Define the IT Processes,
Organisation and Relationships PO4 (with 12 control objectives), Ensure Continuous Service DS4
(10) and Ensure Systems Security DS5 (11) were found to have the greatest number of control
objectives containing information assurance concepts. Table 4 displays a summary of the results, with
the frequency of COBIT’s control objectives containing information assurance concepts in the four
domains, which were mapped to each chapter of ACSI 33.
Table 4 suggests that the method used is able to identify data patterns between two IT security
standards. For example, the frequency of mapped control objectives from ACSI 33 to COBIT was

much higher for Part 3 of ACSI 33 on Security Standards (with 531) than for Part 2 on ICT Security
Administration (with 224). This finding suggests that the two example IT standards considered had
greater common ground for security standards than for the administration of security issues. The
method allows these global patterns, and others, to be revealed. As another example, the frequency of
alignment between the control objectives of COBIT and individual ACSI 33 chapters ranged from
four, for Chapter 5 of Part 2, Developing a Systems Security Plan (SSP), to 109 for Chapter 5 of Part 3
on Software Security, which again suggests more alignment between the example IT standards for
technical security issues than for organisational or governance issues. These results suggest the areas
where the ICT systems of COBIT-adopting organisations will be strongest and weakest when
encountering terrorist attack. In general, high frequency counts for components of ACSI 33 found in
COBIT suggest closest alignment. However, the frequencies of each concept from each ACSI chapter
need to be examined further, as a high frequency may have arisen from multiple occurrences of the
same single concept.
ACSI 33 chapter
Part 2 - ICT Security Administration
Chapter 1 - ICT Security Roles and Responsibility
Chapter 2 - Security Documentation
Chapter 3 - Identifying and Developing an ICT Security Policy
Chapter 4 - Risk Management
Chapter 5 - Developing SSP
Chapter 6 - Developing and Maintaining Security SOPs
Chapter 7 - Certifying and Accrediting ICT Systems
Chapter 8 - Maintaining ICT Security and Managing Security
Incidents
Chapter 9 - Reviewing ICT Security
Total Control Objectives in Part 2
Part 3 - Security Standards
Chapter 1 - Physical Security
Chapter 2 - Personnel
Chapter 3 - ICT Product Life Cycle
Chapter 4 - Hardware Security
Chapter 5 - Software Security
Chapter 6 - Logical Access Control
Chapter 7 - Active Security
Chapter 8 - Communications Security (Comsec)
Chapter 9 - Cryptography
Chapter 10 - Network Security
Chapter 11 - Data Transfers
Total Control Objectives in Part 3
Total Control Objectives in ACSI 33

Table 4.

PO
28
17
8
20
2
7

AI

DS
1
1

ME

8

10

33

90

33

48

3
7
18

5
5
6
4
3
67
157

5
12
53

56
12
224

5
1
2
1
6

12
22

30

32
21
13
21
4
17
48

3
3

9
12

43
9
25
16
6
117
150

34
10
4
50
41
44
26
18
32
61
19
339
387

Total

3
0
1
4
8
61

37
17
22
62
109
44
40
48
55
75
22
531
755

Frequency of COBIT’s control objectives, presented by COBIT’s domains, containing
information assurance concepts for each chapter of ACSI 33 (PO: Plan and Organize,
AI: Acquire and Implement, DS: Delivery and Support, ME: Monitor and Evaluate).

Figure 1 presents the information assurance-related control objectives from COBIT’s IT processes,
displayed by alignment to Part 1 and Part 2 of ACSI 33, grouped into the four COBIT domains. This
kind of analysis and display provide an overview of where alignment is closest and where it is not.
For example, frequent alignment was found between Part 3 of ACIS 33 and specific IT control
processes of COBIT, particularly DS5 Ensure Systems Security, AI3 Acquire and Maintain
Technology Infrastructure and DS11, Manage Data. These results suggest that where organisations
adopt COBIT and achieve a moderate to high level of control over DS5, AI3 and DS11, they are also

likely to comply with at least some of the requirements of ACSI 33’s Part 2, ICT Security Standard.
However, as indicated earlier the frequency of mapping between COBIT and Part 2 of ACSI 33, ICT
Security Administration, was not as high. Where the alignment is closest to ACSI 33, organisations
adopting COBIT may have lower vulnerability to withstand terrorist attack to their ICT systems, while
higher vulnerability is expected where alignment to ACSI 33 is lower.
As COBIT’s four domains parallel the Systems Development Life Cycle (SDLC), the mapping
method followed and the display used also enable analysis from a life cycle perspective. The SDLC is
represented in Figure 1 from the bottom of the graph to the top. In the example provided in Figure 1,
it can be seen that there is more frequent alignment between the Acquire and Implement, and the
Deliver and Support phases of the life cycle with Part 3 of ACSI 33 on ICT Security Standard, while
there was more alignment at the Plan and Organise, and Monitor and Evaluate phases for Part 2 of
ACSI 33, on ICT Security Administration. From a counter-terrorist perspective, those phases of the life
cycle (and IT processes) with smallest alignment between COBIT and ACSI 33 may require first
attention to determine the degree of exposure. For example in Figure 1 IT processes to ensure
continuous services (DS4) seem to pose more risk than those aimed to ensure systems security (DS5).
Alignment Between COBIT 4.1 and ACSI33 (Information Assurance Focus)
ME4 Provide IT Governance
ME3 Ensure Compliance w ith External Requirements
ME2 Monitor and Evaluate Internal Control
DS13 Manage Operations
DS12 Manage the Physical Environment
DS11 Manage Data
DS10 Manage Problems
DS9 Manage the Conf iguration
DS8 Manage Service Desk and Incidents
DS7 Educate and Train Users
DS5 Ensure System Security
DS4 Ensure Continous Services
DS3 Manage Performance and Capacity
AI7 Install and Accredit Solutions and Changes
AI6 Manage Changes
AI5 Procure IT Resources
AI4 Enable Opertaion and Use
AI3 Acquire and Maintain Technology Inf rastructure
AI2 Acquire and Maintain Application Sof tw are
PO9 Assess and Manage IT Risks
PO7 Manage IT Human Resources
PO6 Communicate Management Aims and Direction
PO4 Def ine the IT Processes, Organization, and Relatinship
PO3 Define Technology Direction
PO2 Define the Inf ormation Inf rastructure
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Part 2: ICT Security Adm inistration

Figure 1.

Part 3: ICT Security Standard

Graph of frequency of information assurance-related control objectives in COBIT’s IT
processes, mapped to ACSI 33 Part 1 & 2.

The conclusions from the study are considered next.

5

CONCLUSIONS

Practitioner studies have examined the alignment of different IT security standards, and the results
have been used in many organisations. However despite this activity, almost no academic-based
research has been reported that investigates the alignment of any kind of IT standards. One barrier to
this research being undertaken is that it appears that no scholarly method has been identified for
analysing the alignment of IT security standards, particularly one that addresses the potential
subjectivity of content analysis. The findings of this study suggest that conceptual analysis, a version
of content analysis that is novel in an IT security context, is a method that is appropriate for mapping
the alignment of IT security-related standards. This study indicates the feasibility of applying Carley’s
(1993) eight-step process when undertaking content analysis for mapping the alignment of IT securityrelated standards, even though the standards mapped may be different in nature. Following Carley’s
(1993) method provides a means of making the process of mapping standards explicit, reducing the
risk of subjectivity. The method offers a way of increasing confidence in the results of future studies
to map the alignment of IT standards.
By mapping two example IT security-related standards, ACSI 33 and the information assurance
elements of COBIT, this study was able to demonstrate the efficacy and the rigour of the method. The
method used has potential for the future mapping of other IT security standards. The study provides a
method that will enable academics and practitioners to have more confidence in the results of studies
into the degree of compliance with one IT security standard when an organisation adopts another to
which the first has been mapped.
The results from mapping the two example standards have potential for use to assess compliance with
ACSI 33 through voluntary adoption of COBIT, given awareness of the extent and depth of adoption
of COBIT. The results of the study also illustrate how knowledge of the alignment of the two specific
standards examined offers value within a counter-terrorism context in Australia. The results do so by
suggesting some of the vulnerabilities and strengths of private enterprise organisations that adopt
COBIT to terrorist attack on their ICT systems, if it is assumed that ACSI 33 provides an appropriate
benchmark for this purpose. As much critical infrastructure in many nations is controlled by private
sector organisations, the vulnerability of their ICT systems to terrorist attack is worthy of
investigation.
For future work the results of mapping IT security standards using the method outlined can also be
used for gap analysis. Gap analysis of existing IT security standards offers potential to strengthen
future versions of those standards, along with the IT security of organisations that implement them.
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